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requirements of the predatory lifestyle 
of many species have led to complex 
and interesting abilities. 
The group of Jayne Gardiner from 
the University of South Florida at 
Tampa, US, together with researchers 
from the University of South Florida 
and Boston University, recently 
described how several shark species 
can combine input from multiple 
sensory channels and switch between 
them if necessary (PLoS ONE (2014) 
9, e93036). The researchers note that 
signal dispersal under water in natural 
conditions is seriously inhibited by 
disturbances such as light scattering. 
Therefore, they created naturalistic 
settings for controlled experiments 
to test the prey-finding behaviour 
of sharks in the presence of such 
difficulties. 
Sharks can use combinations of 
olfactory, turbulence, visual, electrical 
and tactile signals to detect their 
prey. The relative importance of these 
signals varies with the distance of the 
prey and the specific requirements of 
the general situation. The experiments 
showed that the sharks can respond 
flexibly if one information channel is 
blocked. While the initial olfactory 
tracking of prey from a distance 
appears to be a stereotyped, 
species-specific behaviour, the 
animals showed greater plasticity 
in their behaviour on approaching 
the prey, making the best use of 
whatever sensory channels were 
available. Due to this flexibility, they 
can also overcome various kinds of 
camouflage. 
“Our findings may explain why 
previous attempts to use chemical 
deterrents or visual camouflage to 
prevent shark bites haven’t been very 
successful. In many cases, the loss of 
one sensory signal generally doesn’t 
inhibit feeding behavior, as sharks 
can switch to alternate sensory cues 
to locate and capture prey,” notes 
Gardiner.  
Better understanding of these 
processes may ultimately also lead to 
additional strategies to make shark 
attacks on humans even less likely 
than they currently are. Given the 
efficiency of the predators’ sensory 
strategy, we can just be grateful that, 
in contrast to their bad reputation, 
they’re not really interested in us. 
Michael Gross is a science writer based at 
Oxford. He can be contacted via his web 
page at www.michaelgross.co.ukGroup-mindedness
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From the late middle ages until early in 
the twentieth century, ‘Skimmingtons’ 
gave English villagers a highly effective 
instrument of social control, and a 
fun day out for all the family. In a 
Skimmington, couples who had broken 
the social rules — typically the wife was 
a ‘scold’ or the husband a ‘cuckold’ — 
were ridiculed by a ludicrous cavalcade 
(Figure 1). In the lead was a horse 
carrying grotesque effigies of the 
offending pair, back-to-back, with the 
woman wielding a (skimming) ladle. 
Close behind were barking dogs and 
all the righteous of the parish, hooting, 
blowing horns and beating pans to let 
the offending couple, cowering in their 
hovel, know exactly how they felt about 
failure to conform. The Skimmington 
ritual was both a punishment and a 
warning. On its way to the home of the 
victims, the procession brushed the 
door steps of other anomalous couples. 
Toe the line or next time it will be you. 
Skimmingtons are one manifestation 
of the kind of hypersociality that 
distinguishes our species, modern 
humans, from all other animals. We 
don’t just happen to live in groups 
that include unrelated and distantly 
related individuals, we have to live this 
way. We depend on cooperation with 
others, alive and dead, not just for 
the higher things in life — art, justice, 
spirituality, prosperity — but for the 
satisfaction of basic bodily needs. 
Most of us would starve if we didn’t 
cooperate with others to find and 
prepare food. Given this dependence, 
it’s not surprising that we’re ‘group-
minded’. Each of us identifies with 
the groups and cultures to which 
we belong, tries to conform to their 
norms, and participates in rituals that 
reinforce group identity — singing or 
dining together, watching our team try 
to win the cup — or, as in the case of 
Skimmingtons, in rituals that shame 
and punish those who have failed 
to conform. Courts of law are less 
Book review colourful and usually more humane than Skimmingtons but they fulfil a 
similar function. 
In his book, A Natural History of 
Human Thinking, the distinguished 
developmental psychologist Michael 
Tomasello lays out his latest views on 
the evolution of group-mindedness. 
Compared with his previous monograph 
on the same subject, The Cultural 
Origins of Human Cognition (Harvard, 
1999), the current story gives more 
cognitive credit to our closest living 
relatives, the great apes, and has more 
twists in the plot. The new ‘shared 
intentionality hypothesis’ suggests 
that, rather than one giant leap, there 
were two major transitions in the 
evolution of human thinking: the first, 
from the ‘individual intentionality’ of 
the ancestors we share with great 
apes, living six million years ago, to the 
‘joint intentionality’ of early humans, 
emerging about 400 thousand years 
ago, and the second, 200−300 thousand 
years later, from joint intentionality to 
the ‘collective intentionality’ of modern 
humans. Curiously, Tomasello doesn’t 
unpack his key term, ‘intentionality’, 
but the Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy defines it as ‘the power of 
minds to be about, to represent, or to 
stand for, things, properties and states 
of affairs’.
The picture of stage one, individual 
intentionality, comes from experiments 
with extant great apes, most of them 
conducted by Tomasello’s group in 
Leipzig. Chimpanzees, gorillas and 
orang-utans are seen as physically 
and socially manipulative creatures. 
They use limited forms of imagination, 
inference and self-monitoring — 
thinking about thinking — to get their 
own way in competition for food, mates 
and other valued resources. They 
can assess whether a stick is rigid 
enough to scrape food out of a tricky 
spot, use rattling as a sign that a solid 
object is in a sealed container, and, 
when competing with others for food, 
keep track of who was looking when 
a juicy morsel was hidden. They also 
use simple gestures for communication, 
raising an arm to initiate play-hitting, 
slapping the ground to attract attention, 
and reaching toward objects they want 
a human to deliver. But great apes don’t 
go in for cooperation. When given a 
choice of acquiring food cooperatively 
or independently, or simply between 
eating with a groupmate or in isolation, 
chimpanzees go it alone. So, Tomasello 
argues, great apes are smarter than 
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Figure 1. Social norms.
A ‘Skimmington riding’ maintained social norms by punishing licentious behaviour with ridicule, and warning potential culprits to conform to 
their society’s values. Skimmingtons were one of the less-than-benign consequences of the group-mindedness that Michael Tomasello regards 
as the unique feature of human cognition. Image courtesy of Trinity Hall, Cambridge. Engraving by James Mynde after William Hogarth.other mammals, they have some 
understanding of causal and intentional
relations, but their intentionality is 
individualistic. Mostly they think about 
what I want and know, and occasionally
when it serves their selfish purposes, 
about what you want and know, but 
never about what we are thinking.
That changed with the advent of joint 
intentionality at stage two. Common 
ancestors of modern humans and 
Neanderthals, perhaps the elusive 
Homo heidelbergensis, began to 
find that they couldn’t get their daily 
bread without working in pairs, and 
consequently to face dilemmas of 
coordination. If I can catch a hare by 
myself, but I need to work with you to 
fell a stag, it’s in my interests to give up 
on the hare and go for the stag only if 
you’re going to do the same thing. So, 
how do I work out what you’re going 
to do? Tomasello’s answer is that early 
humans dealt with this kind of problem 
by evolving a new form of cooperative 
communication, combining pointing 
and pantomiming, and, ‘internalizing’  
, 
this communication, a new way of 
thinking. In the new ‘second-personal’ 
mode of thought, each party in a 
collaborative pair represents joint 
goals and joint attention — what we 
want, and what we perceive — as well 
as each of our roles in the task and 
perspectives on the situation. With the 
dawn of this joint intentionality, agents 
became able and motivated to inform 
rather than manipulate their social 
partners. Imagine that you and I are 
gathering honey together, and I point to 
a stick. I’m not trying to make you use 
it. Rather, I’m letting you know about the 
stick’s location because I realise that 
you may not be able to see it from your 
perspective, and you may want to use 
the stick given your role in our task. 
A lot happens in the transition to 
stage three, collective intentionality. 
Due to increases in population size 
and competition between groups, 
humans now need to cooperate with 
strangers in their group, provoking 
the emergence of both culture and 
language. Individuals begin to regard group membership as a fundamental 
part of their identity, and to decide 
who belongs in which group — and 
therefore who is a potential cooperation 
partner — using shibboleths. The kind 
of container you use to transport your 
honey isn’t just a matter of what works, 
it defines who you are. Consequently, 
there is now a premium on high fidelity 
cultural inheritance of skills, which 
is achieved through norm-guided 
teaching. Novices are taught to make 
the honey pot this way because that’s 
how we do it. To further assist cultural 
inheritance, and to enable cooperation 
among strangers, communication 
becomes vocal and conventional; it 
became language. You don’t just cobble 
together some gestures that might get 
me to notice the stick, you use words 
in sequences that all members of our 
group will understand. And with the 
conventionalisation of communication, 
modern humans began to think in a 
torrent of new ways — to use logical 
operations; to connect beliefs into an 
encompassing inferential ‘web’; to 
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an internal dialogue similar to reasoned 
debate among group members; and to 
represent features of the world, not just 
as your perspective or my perspective, 
but as objectively true, as facts.
Evolutionary psychology is a 
crowded market. There’s no shortage 
of books telling a story about how 
chimp-like ancestors turned into 
modern humans. A Natural History of 
Human Thinking is part of a sub-genre 
that sees the problems and solutions 
as fundamentally social. It was the 
demands of dealing with other agents, 
rather than technological problems, 
that were the primary drivers of human 
evolution, and these demands were 
met, not by expanding and adjusting 
general-purpose cognitive mechanisms, 
but by evolving distinctively social 
ways of thinking. Within this sub-genre, 
Tomasello’s book has two major selling 
points. First, following Sterelny’s The 
Evolved Apprentice (2012), it makes a 
serious attempt to bridge the gap — to 
explain the kind of cooperation that 
must already have been in place to 
enable the evolution of language 
and culture. This is the crucial ‘joint 
intentionality’ stage of Tomasello’s 
model. Second, it is more cognitive than 
other, similar stories — it tries hard not 
only to reconstruct the behaviour of 
our forebears, but to explain what was 
going on inside their heads. Both of 
these ambitions are fulfilled only in part.
The problem with Tomasello’s 
bridge is that he attempts to support 
it with studies of young children, who 
are not a good model of culture-less, 
language-less early humans. The 
language of one- to three-year-olds 
may be limited, but their behaviour 
and ways of thinking have already 
been shaped by thoroughly modern 
humans — their parents and other 
caregivers. Acknowledging this kind of 
evidential problem, Tomasello suggests 
that it is the logic of his stage model 
that really counts. No matter when or 
exactly how they did it, our ancestors 
must have gone through something 
like joint intentionality to get from a 
chimp-like state to our current way of 
life. Well, yes and no. Yes if we accept 
this book’s characterisation of the start 
and end points. No if we doubt, along 
with many primate researchers, that 
chimpanzees are quite as smart as 
Tomasello suggests, or, in the company 
of some linguists, that modern humans 
are really so keen to inform rather than 
manipulate in their use of language. But even if we embrace the sequence 
of three stages — which is certainly 
plausible and clearly drawn — if it’s 
only the logic that counts, the sequence 
might unfold ontogenetically, wholly 
in the course of human development. 
Perhaps we are born competitors with 
individual intentionality and become 
pair-wise collaborators with joint 
intentionality through the enculturation 
and language learning which give us, in 
maturity, collective intentionality.
A natural objection to this idea 
is that there must be some inborn 
differences between us and our 
chimp-like ancestors — genetically 
inherited cognitive adaptations — that 
make possible enculturation and 
language learning. That is surely 
right, but Tomasello’s analysis is 
pitched so high — so preoccupied 
with intentionality — that some good 
candidates may be overlooked. 
Drawing on the work of philosophers 
and historical figures in developmental 
psychology, such as Vygotsky and 
Piaget, but ignoring contemporary 
cognitive science and neuroscience, 
this book is resolutely focused on 
the most complex kinds of thinking. 
It overlooks the myriad ‘subpersonal’ 
processes that go on inside our 
heads — the perceptual, attentional, 
motivational and motoric mechanisms 
that beaver away below the intentional 
surface. It could be genetically-based 
changes to these mechanisms — such 
as the inborn human tendency to 
look at faces, and to enjoy contingent 
interaction — that lay the foundations 
for enculturation.
But these reservations should not 
detract from Tomasello’s achievement. 
Especially when discussing 
communication, the breadth of his 
scholarship and clarity of his analysis 
are truly impressive. There’s a tendency 
in evolutionary psychology and beyond 
to see language as the Rubicon — the 
thing that changed everything — but 
very few authors are able to lay out in 
detail the full range of challenges and 
opportunities that language presents. 
So, in this respect and many others, 
this is an important book. It offers a 
subtle and authoritative contemporary 
statement of the view that human 
thinking — which yields both beautiful 
ideas and nasty Skimmingtons — is 
naturally and fundamentally social. 
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How did you end up a professor and 
curator without a college degree? 
I’d like to blame the lack of a college 
degree on the 60s, but dyslexia was 
the reason. I graduated last in my 
class in high school and flunked out 
of college seven times. I read words 
letter by letter and have virtually no 
short-term memory. Reading is still 
the hardest thing I do in my life. I 
discovered early in my career that 
if I worked on subjects others had 
neglected or simply not thought of, 
there really wasn’t much of anything 
to read. My first job was at Princeton 
University as a technician in their 
natural history museum. My boss, 
Don Baird, taught me how to write 
research papers and NSF grants. One 
of my first papers was in Nature, so 
Princeton promoted me to research 
scientist status. Shortly thereafter I 
was hired by Montana State University 
to be the curator of paleontology at 
the Museum of the Rockies. I wasn’t 
able to have students, or write NSF 
grants, or teach classes, but that 
all changed when I received my 
honorary doctorate and the MacArthur 
Fellowship.
When did you first become interested 
in biology? I was born loving nature, 
but on the plains of Montana, where 
I was raised, there was precious 
little living nature to observe. At a 
very young age I began collecting 
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